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At the turn of the last century, outward tranquillity was 
bestowed upon the Western Balkans, the most volatile and 
troublesome part of the European continent. The termination of 
large scale violence, however, did not add up to long-term 
stability in the region. Its political elites have proven to be 
incapable and/or unwilling to resolve their differences among 
themselves and peacefully in order to provide for the region’s 
security. The management of the most burning problems in the 
Western Balkans would be best assured within the process of 
European integration. With active and well-coordinated roles 
played by key international organizations, the Western Balkans 
could eventually be transformed into a region of security, 
democracy, and prosperity.  
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Recent political tensions in and related to Kosovo, Serbia, 
Macedonia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina have again attracted 
attention to the Western Balkans in the media and important 
international bodies (UN, OSCE, EU, NATO). The purpose of 
this article is to elucidate the Balkans' manifold complexity, its 
conflict potential, the recent geopolitical shifts in and around 
the region, the controversial problem of Kosovo, its 
international implications and the lessons that could be drawn 
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General characteristics of the region 
 
During the last two centuries, the Western Balkans have rightly 
earned the distinction of the most volatile and troublesome part 
of the European continent. Throughout the XXth century local 
armed conflicts and coalition wars with continental 
implications, terrorism, uprisings, revolutions, coups d’etat, 
mass expulsion of population, outright genocide, and other 
forms of violence have at almost regular intervals punctured 
the periods of regional peace. After four decades of relative 
calm, the latest bouts of bloody violence and wars in the region 
took place again in 1990-1995 and in 1998-1999.1 
The former of the two upsurges was largely triggered by 
otherwise positive developments – by the end of the “Cold 
War”, the breakdown of communist regimes and by the 
ensuing transition of Eastern Europe to more democratic 
political systems and market economies. The Western Balkans 
have once again shown high sensitivity to the shifts in the 
balance of power among major extraregional actors. In these 
respects the Balkans have differed very appreciably from all 
other regions in Europe, including the Northern half of former 
Eastern Europe. Not incidentally, the geopolitical fault line 
stretching from South-Eastern Europe eastward all the way to 
the Pacific was branded by Z. Brzezinski the “Euroasian 
Balkans”.2 
The geopolitical instability in the Balkans has deep historical 
roots. More than a millennium of numerous incursions, 
conquests, and migrations created a unique and most 
heterogonous mixture of peoples and ethnic groups speaking 
different languages and professing different religions in the 
Balkans.3 South Eastern Europe overlaps partly with the 
Mediterranean, Central Europe, Pannonian and the Black Sea 
                                                          
1 Blank, Stephen J. (ed.), Yugoslavia’s wars: The problem from hell, Carlisle, Pa, Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995, Chapters 2, 3, 5, 6 
2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Basic Books, 1997, New York,  Chapter 3 
‘Euroasian Balkans’, pp. 7-25, 29-45, 99-108 
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regions. The central part of South Eastern Europe, the Balkans, 
have for many centuries been divided between several empires, 
with extra regional centres of power. They have therefore never 
become a viable and coherent region in the cultural, economic, 
or political sense. Its present name was invented about three 
and a half centuries ago by outsiders, German geographers, 
who mis-used the Turkish word for “mountain.” After four 
centuries of Ottoman domination and their withdrawal from 
most of their former European possessions, the Balkans has 
become a complicated, political mosaic, which clearly lacks its 
own centre of gravity. The recent disintegration of ex–
Yugoslavia in 1991-1992 has greatly increased the number of 
states in the Western Balkans. The proclamation of Kosovo´s 
independence was the latest development in this direction. 
However, the potential for further political fragmentation in the 
region, largely following the ethnic–national lines, has not been 
fully exhausted, in spite of the general disapproval of 
‘Balkanization’ by major powers. Smaller states which resulted 
from the breakdown are today much less heterogeneous from 
the ethnic, religious, and cultural view-points than had been the 
SFR of Yugoslavia. Serbia, Croatia, and Kosovo have also 
become ethnically and culturally more homogeneous within 
their own boundaries. 
The dramatic change, wars, and other developments since 
the late 1980s have caused huge economic dislocation and 
damage to the region.4 The Western Balkans still have not 
reached the pre-1991 levels of industrial and agricultural 
production. In some parts of the region war losses, dislocation 
of human and natural resources, the breakdown of previously 
integrated transportation and energy systems, economic 
fragmentation and the loss of markets, wiped out the positive 
results of up to three decades of the preceding economic 
progress. The very uneven damage to their economies has 
greatly increased the disparities between the most and the least 
prosperous parts of the region. The intraregional differentials in 
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GNP per capita and in the level of unemployment inside have 
gone up tremendously. Huge disparities inside the same region 
inevitably feed illegal trafficking and organized crime. It is 
estimated, for example, that about eighty percent of heroin is 
being smuggled to the EU area from/via the Balkans. Social 
instability, economic difficulties and political unrest have very 
significantly contributed to the continuity of negative national 
and religious stereotypes created and maintained by the 
generations–long indoctrination with historical myths.5 
Interethnic tensions have been further magnified by modern 
mass media, manipulated and exploited by ruthless politicians. 
The traumatic history of the region has thus served as a 
powerful tool for mass mobilization with nationalist, religious 
and xenophobic slogans. All this has led to the most tragic 
results in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. 
 
 
The present security situation in the Balkans 
 
The tectonic geopolitical shifts in the early 1990s and the crisis 
of neutralism and nonalignment led to a radical political and 
military realignment in the Balkans and also in the region’s 
relations with external powers. With the greatly reduced 
Russian influence, and the total eclipse of the shortly-lived 
Chinese political presence in Albania, practically the entire 
region has become oriented towards the West. As the region 
also lacks mineral, energy, or other resources on a large scale, 
its geopolitical importance has relatively decreased. The 
Balkans has furthermore ceased to be an object of overt contests 
for political and military control or domination by external 
powers. The extra-regional sources of conflict in, over, or about 
the Balkans have been therefore greatly reduced. Most 
importantly, the Balkans are not anymore Europe’s powderkeg 
as they were in 1914, and instead gained in international 
notoriety as a source of incessant trouble and as a costly 
nuisance. On the other hand, the geopolitical shifts have also 
                                                          
5 Batt, Judy, Introduction: the stabilisation/integration dilemma in The Western Balkans: 
Moving on, Chaillot Paper no.70, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2004, p.p. 7 - 19 
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greatly diminished the big powers’ positive motivation to 
provide international assistance to the region.  
Since June 1999, outward tranquility has been imposed on 
the Western Balkans. After several unsuccessful attempts by 
UN, CSCE/OSCE and EEC/EU6, this highly positive change 
was achieved primarily by NATO. The Western powers, after 
considerable hesitation, had decided then to intervene in the 
Balkans, politically and militarily. The end of armed conflict in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia was followed by the advances of competitive 
political democracy. Albeit this political change has remained 
largely superficial. The tranquility in the region has been 
preserved since 1996 by several de facto international 
protectorates over its parts. These systems of external 
surveillance and assistance in several potential trouble spots 
have included the stationing of peace-keeping and stabilization 
troops, the presence of international police, armed and 
unarmed observers, judges, ombudsmen, administrative 
overseers etc.  
As noted earlier, the termination of the East–West political 
and military rivalry in the Balkans has had, security-wise, both 
negative and positive consequences. The suppression of armed 
violence by superior force did not add up to long-term regional 
stability, as was recently manifested in Kosovo, Serbia, and 
Macedonia. The security situation in the Western Balkans still 
remains precarious and we observe in the region a combination 
of old sources of tensions and some new positive developments 
since the early 1990’s. Under the veneer of tranquility some 
serious political and security problems still persist in the 
Western Balkans: 
 the presence of intolerance, pathological nationalism and 
xenophobia; 
 underdeveloped democratic political culture, lacking the 
art of compromise; 
 several varieties of non-military threats to regional 
                                                          
6 Burg, L. Steven, Negotiating a settlement: lessons of the diplomatic process in 
Yugoslavia’s wars: The problem from hell, 1995, p.p. 47 - 86 
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security and stability (ill- governance, corruption, 
organized crime, illegal trafficking in arms, drugs, human 
beings etc.); 
 unresolved political problems of interstate borders and 
minorities;  
 the humanitarian problem of well over a million refugees 
and displaced persons. 
Many attempts have been made in the past to create region-
wide webs of security in the Balkans. These included two 
Balkans defense pacts, one in the 1930s and the other in the 
1950s. The first failed miserably while the second – the Balkan 
pact between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey signed in August 
1954 - never became a reality. So far none of the regionally 
generated initiatives and undertakings has proven viable, 
largely because they have never led to sustained political 
activity on a regional basis. Moreover, all Balkans initiatives 
have, as a rule, lacked the support and active involvement by 
the public, mass media, and civil society.  
A more promising approach to cure the instability in the 
region has manifested itself in the efforts to induce and infuse 
from outside economic, political and security cooperation with 
and among all Balkans states.7 These efforts have resulted from 
the 1980s in a web of ties among these states and between them 
and a number of international organizations. This web has been 
almost exclusively Western in origin and included such nets as 
the “Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe”, CEFTA, SECI, 
NATO’s “Partnership for Peace”, “South East Europe 
Initiative”, “South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering 
Group” et. al. The European Union has promoted and 
supported regional integration in the Western Balkans by 
concluding several types of cooperation, stabilization and 
association agreements. The agreements have served as 
preliminary steps in bringing closer to and hopefully eventually 
admitting all remaining Balkan states into the ranks of its future 
members. This strategy of staged integration has been 
                                                          
7 Delevic, Milica, Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, Chaillot Paper no.104, 
Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2007, Ch.2,3, pp. 31-72 
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successfully practiced earlier with two other groups of former 
Eastern European states - the Visegrad group and the three 
Baltic republics. 
However, the nets involving the Balkans states have been 
overly dependent on outside donors, mostly understaffed, 
poorly interconnected, and coordinated. Despite these 
shortcomings, a few of them have proven to be effective. In 
addition, some of these nets have partly blocked one another. 
For example, the EU enlargement has undermined the 
previously existing free trade and visa-free regimes and in fact 
erected new interstate barriers in the region. The EU visa rules 
and the extension of the Schengen regime have created 
considerable problems on the practical level which have 
hampered the movement of persons, economic, and cultural 
cooperation in the region. There has also been a conceptual 
incongruity between the “Stability Pact for South-Eastern 
Europe’’ and the “Stabilization and Association Process” 
conducted by the European Union. 
 
 
The Kosovo problem and its international implications  
 
Kosovo’s proclamation of independence on February 17, 2008 
and the birth of the youngest European state have highlighted 
the salience of historically generated sources of intraregional 
tensions and conflicts in the region.8  
In late XIX c. – early XX c. Kosovo was a minor chapter in the 
wider Albanian question within the Ottoman Empire. Kosovo, 
as a separate and potentially volatile issue, was created in 1912-
1913 by the Kingdom of Serbia and the Russian Empire with the 
assistance of other great European powers. Prior to 1912 Serbia, 
Greece and Montenegro had, for many years, conspired with 
the Russian Empire to prevent the appearance of an 
independent Albanian state on the ruins of the Ottoman’s 
possessions in the Western Balkans. According to their 
                                                          
8 Delevic, Milica, The Kosovo problem in a regional perspective in The Regional cooperation 
in the Western Balkans, Chaillot Paper no.10, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 
2007, p.p.79 – 82 
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coordinated plans, the three Orthodox states were to occupy 
and partition the lands with the majority Albanian population 
thus forestalling an Albanian declaration of independence. 
Consequently, the Serbian army invaded Kosovo in 1912 on its 
way to conquer Northern Albania and its main port Durres. 
However, Serbia’s plans to gain by force a permanent territorial 
access to the Mediterranean sea were foiled by Austro-Hungary 
and Italy. In 1913 bowing to an Austro-Hungarian ultimatum 
the Serbian Army hesitantly withdrew from Northern Albania. 
The European powers - Great Britain, France, Germany, Austro-
Hungary, and Italy, at Russia’s insistence, allowed Serbia and 
Montenegro to retain the already occupied Eastern parts of the 
Ottoman possessions inhabited predominately by the 
Albanians, other Muslims, and Slavic Macedonians.9 These 
lands (the Sandzhak of Novi Pazar, today’s Kosovo and 
Western Macedonia) were absorbed by Serbia without a 
properly executed annexation. The new Serbian possessions 
were incorporated in 1918-1919 into the Kingdom of the Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes10 which was later renamed into the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  
Between the two World Wars the problem of Kosovo had 
been a destabilizing internal political and security issue which 
contributed to the first Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1941. It 
continued to create considerable internal troubles also in the 
second, post-1945 communist Yugoslavia. After the latter’s 
demise in 1991-1992, the Kosovo problem was, for several 
years, totally ignored by the international community and 
reappeared only in 1997-1998 as an unresolved regional 
political problem; the last vestige of Yugoslavia’s succession 
wars.  
The Kosovo issue has maintained, at its core, a political 
conflict between the Kosovar Albanians’ desire for national 
emancipation and self-determination, and on the other hand, 
Serbia’s endeavors to continue ruling the land from Belgrade. 
                                                          
9 Kola, Paulin, The search for greater Albania, Hurst & Company, London, 2003, pp. 10-
18 
10 Noel, Malcolm, Kosovo, A Short History, London, Macmillan, 1998, pp. 43-50,61-
63,129-256,289-294, 314-316 
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For the Serbian cultural and political elites, Kosovo has been a 
cherished symbol of Serbia’s past glory. Following the NATO 
intervention in March-June 1999, the Serbian rule over Kosovo 
was abruptly terminated, and was never peacefully 
reestablished. The re-imposition by armed force under present 
political climate in Europe is out of the question. A compromise 
in the form Kosovo’s wide autonomy within Serbia had been 
enshrined by the last SFRY constitution of 1974. This historic 
compromise was however effectively annulled by the Milosevic 
regime in 1989. This brutal unilateral act by Serbia accompanied 
by the presence of tanks in the streets of Pristina, grossly 
violated the Yugoslav constitutional order. Moreover, the 
Yugoslav military and Serbian police committed numerous 
crimes against the Kosovar Albanians and other Muslims in 
Kosovo in 1989-1999, including: e.g. causing the deaths of at 
least 10,000 Kosovars. According to the UNHCR statistics, 
about 350,000 persons, mostly Albanians, were forced by 
Serbian authorities to leave Kosovo in 1998, and nearly 1.5 
million by June 1999.11 
Since the summer of 1999, Kosovo had been a NATO 
protectorate and a de facto, mostly self-governing country under a 
UN mandate, fully separate and independent from Serbia. During 
this period Kosovo had developed a different political and 
economic system and adopted a different currency.12 During these 
years, the economic, social, and political situation in Kosovo had 
significantly improved. This progress was due to international 
assistance (around 21% GNP), and the Kosovars’ remittances from 
abroad (roughly15% of GNP). Gross national product per capita in 
Kosovo has quadrupled to today’s approximate € 1000 p.c. It 
remains, however, twice lower than in the neighbouring Balkans 
states, while poverty (about 45% of the population) and very high 
unemployment still prevail (well over 40%, and about 70% among 
females and youth). The international community spends, on its 
regular activities in Kosovo, about € 2 billion annually, although 
                                                          
11 Kola, Paulin, The search for greater Albania, Hurst & Company, London, 2003, p.p. 
363 
12 Altmann, Franz-Lothar, The status of Kosovo in What status for Kosovo?, Chaillot 
Paper no. 50, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2001, p.p. 19 – 32 
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mostly on maintaining security and on remuneration of its 
representatives. Only a small fraction of these funds (5-8%) flows 
directly into Kosovo’s economy.  
The problem of Kosovo’s status was formally resolved by a 
unilateral declaration of independence, with a tacit approval of 
US and major EU members. This action was carried out, 
however, without a prior UN Security Council resolution 
approving Martti Ahtisaari’s recommendation, but also without 
a condemnation of, let alone annulling Kosovo’s independence, 
as Serbia demanded. The essentials of M. Ahtisaari’s 
recommendation (commissioned by the UN Secretary General) 
are nevertheless being implemented by Kosovo’s 
democratically elected authorities with the assistance provided 
by a large EU mission called EULEX. This mission started 
operating on June 15, 2008, when the new constitution of 
Kosovo came into effect. Its legality has been claimed by the 
Western powers under the existing UNSC Resolution 1244, and 
challenged by the Russian Federation. As the UN mandate was 
not terminated due to disagreements in the Security Council the 
presence of UNMIK, OSCE, and NATO has continued under 
the resolution. The political problem of Kosovo, therefore, 
remains on Europe’s agenda in addition to its wider 
geopolitical reverberations. 
Today, Kosovo represents only one of the numerous political 
conflicts in the world that is closely related to the ethnic, 
national, linguistic, cultural, and religious divides within 
sovereign states. In the Euro-Atlantic area alone these problems 
span from Quebec, Greenland, Scotland, Ulster, Catalunya, and 
Basque country in Spain, Belgium, Corsica in France, to Slovakia, 
Estonia, Western Ukraine, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Western 
Macedonia, Eastern Moldova, Southern Russia and Cyprus. 
Further to the East the ethnically related trouble spots include 
Abhazia and Southern Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorni Karabah 
Palestine, and Northern Iraq. This chain of political instability 
stretches all the way to Tibet, Taiwan, Shri Lanka, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia. The total number of similar problems 
threatening the stability of multiethnic and multireligious states 
in Africa is also high. Each of these conflicts has been dealt with 
(or ignored) by the international community separately. Thus, 
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the solution of Kosovo’s status need not create a spill-over effect 
and/or be replicated elsewhere. It was unnecessary for the 
Russian Federation to cite the recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence by the West as justification for recognizing 
Abhazia’s and Southern Osetia’s independence. In these three, 
only in some respects similar developments both the Russian 
Federation and most EU and NATO member states acted 
inconsequentially in honouring the principle of self-
determination in one case and rejecting it in the other(s).  
Since the end of the ‘Cold War’ there have been close to two 
dozen changes of internationally recognized borders in the 
Euro-Atlantic area, mostly without a UN Security Council 
approval. Each of these changes - in Germany, former 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union took its own 
course. The political effects of the new interstate borders has 
mostly positively affected European security. The same could 
be eventually expected from adjusting Kosovo’s legal status vis-
a-vis Serbia to the de facto situation since 1999, and from the new 
interstate border between Serbia and Kosovo, once the relations 
between the two states are normalized. 
 
 
International community facing the Western Balkans 
 
The Balkans’ political elites have proven time and time again 
their unwillingness and/or inability to reach agreements on 
conflictual issues by mutual accommodation and compromise. 
This fundamental feature has been demonstrated, i.a. in the 
longstanding Greek-Macedonian dispute over the constitutional 
name of Macedonia and in the Serbian-Kosovar Albanian 
negotiations on the status of Kosovo. When involved in conflicts 
with their neighbors, the Balkan elites usually strive to embroil 
outside powers instead of trying to solve the problems bilaterally 
or within a regional framework. Mainly for this reason the recent 
Balkan conflicts stimulated political and military involvement by 
four permanent members of the UN Security Council (US, UK, 
France, and the Russian Federation). The Balkan conflicts have 
also been, almost continuously, on the agendas of the UN, 
CSCE/OSCE, EEC/EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe, 
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apparently contributing to the already existing divisions and 
antagonisms among the great powers. 13 The Kosovo problem 
has served as a source or a pretext for interstate tensions, notably 
between the USA, major EU members, the Russian Federation, 
and Serbia.  
The Kosovo problem posed a serious challenge to NATO's 
political cohesion in 1998-1999. The Alliance was able then to 
soften the differences among its members and to reach a 
consensus concerning the pending forceful military action 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in March of 1999. 
Nine years later the question of Kosovo’s status has again 
divided the EU and NATO. A majority of their members has 
accepted M. Ahtisaari´s recommendation as the least bad of all 
available alternatives and consequently recognized Kosovo’s 
independence. A minority of EU and NATO members, notably 
Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Slovakia and Romania have remained, 
so far, closer to Serbia’s rejectionist position. The disagreements 
among the EU members were more visible in 2008 than were 
the discords among the EEC members in 1991 concerning the 
recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence. This 
comparison does not speak well for the coherence of the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy fifteen years after its 
official launching in 1993.  
The international record of dealing with the sources of 
instability and insecurity in the Western Balkans has 
highlighted the importance of: 
 clear understanding and realistic appreciation of the 
complexity of problems in the Western Balkans which 
defy quick unidimensional solutions; 
 the previously underestimated interconnection between 
the security in the region and  the security in other parts 
of the continent;  
 a robust and well-coordinated international action to 
improve the economic and social situation in the region 
and to repair and develop its infrastructure; 
                                                          
13 Sophia, Clement, The International Community response in Conflict Prevention in the 
Balkans, (Chaillot Paper no. 30), Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p.p. 46-74 
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 the great contribution to conflict management and 
stabilization in the Western Balkans made by NATO and 
EU members (France, UK, Germany, Italy, Turkey, 
Greece), and also by some non-members, including the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine; 
 the fundamental need for consensus among and 
coordinated actions by Western powers, particularly by 
USA and EU members states;  
 the need for a rational division of labor and effective 
coordination of activities between numerous international 
actors operating in and/or dealing with the region (UN, 
OSCE, NATO, EU, Contact group, etc.); and also between 
various programs conducted under their sponsorship; 
 avoiding the danger of a vicious circle of dependency on 
the presence of foreign peace-keepers (as was in Cyprus) 
and the adoption of a realistic exit strategy for them. 
These observations are relevant also in the case of the 
youngest Balkan state. Having become an independent country, 
Kosovo ought to join the activities of several international 
organizations and regional interstate networks in the Western 
Balkans. Kosovo’s joining these bodies will have beneficial 
effects on the overall security situation in the Balkans. After all, 
the more overlapping Balkan institutions that exist and 
function, the better it is for the region and for the whole Euro-
Atlantic community. The EU-supported “South-East European 
Cooperation Process” (SEECP) has fostered multifaceted 
cooperation among the states of the Western Balkan. Its 
successor–the ‘’Regional Cooperation Council,’’ with the seat of 
its Secretariat in Sarajevo will hopefully continue with success 
this laudable effort. All states aspiring to become members of 
the European Union and/or of NATO have been warned that 
their admission into these organizations are conditional on their 
commitment to fulfill constructively their responsibilities in the 
region. The implementation of this injunction would certainly 
help to promote regional cooperation. 14 
                                                          
14 Van Meurs, Wim (ed.), Prospects and Risks Beyond EU Enlargement, Southeastern 
Europe: Weak States and Strong International Support, Opladen, Leske + Budrich, 
2003, pp. 16-20 
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A note of caution ought to be added concerning the general 
proposition that the management of Balkan problems would be 
best assured within the framework of European integration.13 
The rejection of the ‘Treaty on a constitution for new Europe’ by 
French and Dutch voters indicated i.e. the rather wide-spread 
resistance in the older member states to further EU enlargement 
to Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Thus, the question of the so-
called EU ´´absorption capacity´´ ought to be realistically 
reviewed in a new light. It is questionable whether in the near 
future EU will be willing and able to implement, in full, the 
Thesaloniki commitments to the Western Balkans states. A 
substantial scaling down and delaying the implementation of 





The above-presented review of the problems in and related to 
the Western Balkans leads to the question of how to deal with 
the Western Balkans? First of all, the Western Balkans countries 
should be actively encouraged to further develop and 
strengthen the existing ties among themselves by forming 
pragmatic regional networks of cooperation in practical 
matters. On the other hand, one could not realistically expect 
the Balkan countries to overcome the persisting sources of 
internal instability in the region entirely by their own efforts. 
The Balkan elites, if left alone, are simply incapable of 
transforming the region into a viable and peaceful community 
of nations even distantly comparable e.g. to Scandinavia. 
The international community’s ability to manage numerous 
problems in the Western Balkans could be best improved by the 
further strengthening of the European Union’s and of NATO’s 
presence and influence in the area. This extension and 
upgrading should be done in cooperation with the UN, OSCE, 
Council of Europe, the World Bank, EBRD, etc. Moreover, 
international military and police presence in several neuralgic 
spots (particularly in Kosovo) will be needed for many years. 
The qualitative transformation of the region should be firmly 
imbedded in the broader European integration process. 
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Association and partnership arrangements as well as EU and 
NATO membership ought to be extended to all worthy and 
aspiring candidates, preventing the appearance of new lines of 
division within the region. 
This has been one of Slovenia’s main objectives during its 
presidency in the Council of the European Union in the first 
half of 2008. During these six months, there was indeed 
progress in this direction, including the extension of 
stabilization and association agreements, which now cover the 
entire region, except Kosovo. The process of EU and NATO 
enlargement is expected to transform the Western Balkans into 
a desired space of democracy, economic and cultural 
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